Observe only
The decision core is verified.
Audit mode returns Allow for a Baseline disposition, keeps logged true, and exposes the Allow enforcement preview.
Endpoint protection
Audit mode evaluates a baseline executable locally, preserves execution, and exposes the tested enforcement preview.
Aran Cage creates a copy-on-write project twin, confines a trusted-but-fallible agent to declared zones, then gives you the exact divergence set to merge or discard. It is not a claim of an adversarial VM boundary or live two-way host sync.
A local Cage run keeps the host baseline read-only, records the agent's divergence, and requires review before changes return to the real project.
Step 1: Create a local project twin
The host baseline is read-only; unchanged content is shared until the agent writes.
Step 2: Run the agent in declared zones
The agent writes inside the Cage's tracked workspace rather than directly into the real project.
Step 3: Review, merge, or discard
Inspect the divergence set, merge only approved files, or discard the twin with the real project untouched.
This sequence uses the shipped classifier and policy-decision tuple. It is not live enforcement or a persisted endpoint audit record.
A verified Audit-mode decision evaluates a baseline executable, then returns Allow with its enforcement preview.
Step 1: Audit-mode boundary
The verified decision uses Audit mode. Endpoint enrollment and effective-policy setup remain required; no public command is shown.
Step 2: Evaluate the baseline fixture
The tested C:/app.exe fixture resolves to the Baseline disposition through the local classifier.
Step 3: Inspect the decision fields
The decision returns Allow, logged true, and an Allow enforcement preview with reason audit: allowed + logged.
Aran separates verified decision logic from endpoint setup, beta driver paths, and unavailable execution enforcement.
Observe only
Audit mode returns Allow for a Baseline disposition, keeps logged true, and exposes the Allow enforcement preview.
Setup needed
Use an enrolled Windows endpoint and effective application-control policy. No public Aran installer is shown.
Beta
Windows tamper protection and continuous data protection remain beta and are outside this decision proof.
Unavailable
The reviewed application-control path does not establish live process blocking, so this page does not claim an enforcement result.
Cage modules have separate platform gates. This observe-only decision does not claim Cage activation.
Keybound is an Aran endpoint-security module. This workflow neither activates it nor claims a Keybound result, and Keybound is not a sixth public product.
The decision trace is product behavior evidence, not a certification, authorization, or compliance claim.
Keybound seals your provider keys to the device's hardware. The application reads no key, so a leaked .env, a copied dotfile, or an exfiltrated disk image carries nothing anyone can replay.
The same three steps in every backend language: install the agent, delete the key line, and a stolen file stops being worth stealing.
Step 1: Install the agent
A small local daemon, installed once per host. It holds the hardware-bound identity; your application does not change yet.
Step 2: Delete the key line
Remove the line that reads the key from the environment. Add a process-entry hook — no source change — or one import if you prefer it explicit.
Step 3: The theft stops mattering
A leaked dotfile, a copied disk image, an exfiltrated .env — none of them carry anything a thief can replay, because the key never left the device.